Introduction
1. The European Union (EU) has had competence over trade in goods since its inception in 1957. 2 The EU has exercised this external competence through its Common Commercial Policy (CCP). As one of the most dynamic fields of EU external relations, the scope and the nature of the CCP has evolved through decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and treaty revisions.
2. This Report surveys how EU competence in areas of trade and investment has developed over time, with particular reference to the most important substantive and institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. It sheds light on the issues with respect to which the division of competences between the EU and the Member States is most contested. This is a vast and complex area of law. The further reading list at the end of this text provides more detail.1. EU Competence before the Treaty of Lisbon 3 the Agreement on Natural Rubber was to smooth price fluctuations through the use of a buffer stock. Accordingly, natural rubber was released onto the market when prices hit a ceiling and purchased when prices hit a floor. The Court took a broad view of the CCP's scope, arguing that the CCP should be interpreted dynamically in keeping with the changing character of international trade. To restrict the CCP to traditional measures of commercial policy would render the CCP useless in the course of time. Nevertheless, the Court held on account of the financial contribution by member states to the buffer stock that the participation of Member States was necessary, with the result that it had to be concluded as a mixed agreement.
5. With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the scope of the multilateral trade system in the mid 1990s expanded to include services and intellectual property rights. The result of the Uruguay Round was the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, which established an institutional framework for trade relations among its Member Countries. Annexed to the framework WTO Agreement were several further multilateral agreements laying down substantive rights and duties, notably the General Agreements on Trade in Goods (GATT) of 1947, the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). As both the EC and the Member States individually became WTO members, the question arose whether the EC's competence to join the WTO was exclusive.
6. The Court analysed the question in its well known ruling, Opinion 1/94.
6
The Court first concluded that all the WTO agreements on trade in goods came within the CCP, confirming the broad conception of 'trade' of its previous case law. It then considered the question of competences in the field of services and intellectual property rights. Having regard to the open nature of commercial policy, the Court did not see any reason in principle to exclude trade in services from the CCP's scope. However, examining different modes of supply as defined in Article I GATS, 7 it found that only cross-border supply of services was sufficiently similar to trade in goods. The three other modes involving the entry or movement of persons, and similarly transport services, did not fall within the scope of the CCP. As regards the TRIPS Agreement, the Court held that Article 113 EC only covered the provisions on the release into free circulation of counterfeit goods, while the rest of the TRIPS was outside the CCP's scope. The reason was that the primary purpose of TRIPS was not to regulate trade but to harmonise the protection of intellectual property rights. In rejecting the Commission's argument on implied competences, the Court found that the Community and Member States shared competence to conclude both GATS and TRIPS. 4 7. In reaction to the Opinion 1/94, the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) expanded the CCP to include trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property. The Treaty of Amsterdam enabled the Council to extend the CCP to other areas by unanimous decision on a proposal of the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, without the need for further treaty amendment. This option, however, has not been used. The Nice Treaty added further scope to Article 133 TEC, bringing trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property under the auspices of the CCP. At the same time, it also included several exceptions to the scope of the EC's exclusive competence (e.g. agreements on trade in educational, cultural and audio visual services), with the result that these were required to be mixed agreements. The amendments have been criticised on, among other grounds, the lack of clarity regarding the meaning of 'trade in services' and 'commercial aspects of intellectual property', the limitation of the shared competence to certain services, and the exclusion of autonomous measures by Member States in these area due to the explicit reference to international agreements. 8
Implied External Competence
8. An important milestone in the development of the EU's external competences was the recognition that the EU does not only enjoy external competences if and insofar as the treaties explicitly confer such competences, but can also enjoy implicit competences. These follow from other Treaty provisions and measures adopted based on them. The ECJ established the doctrine of implied competences in the groundbreaking AETR case, 9 in which the Court recognised the Community's competence to conclude an international agreement even in the absence of express recognition of such competence in the Treaties. The case concerned the question whether the Commission or the Member States had the competence to negotiate and conclude the European Agreement Concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport (AETR). 10 The Court argued that the authority of the Community to enter into agreements follows not only from express attribution of competences, but may flow from other Treaty provisions and from measures adopted by the EC institutions. The ECJ explained that when the EC adopted common rules with a view to adopting a common policy, the Member States were barred from adopting their own conflicting measures. The Court thus articulated the principle of pre-emption in respect of external relations (the AETRprinciple). As the relevant Treaty provisions on transport and Regulation no. 543/69 11 covered the same subject matter as AETR agreement, Member State action was pre-empted and the AETR fell within the scope of common transport policy. Three decades later in Open Skies, the Court clarified that the AETR principle applies even in the absence of a conflict between the provision of an 5 international agreement and internal EU legislation. 12 The Court stated that the EU had exclusive competence where the international commitments fell within the scope of common rules or the area covered by such rules. In such a case the Member State could not enter into international commitments even if there was no contradiction between those commitments and the common rules.
9. In the AETR case the community exercised its internal (transport) competence. By contrast, if the internal competences have yet to be exercised at the time of negotiating or concluding the agreement, the EC's external competence to conclude an agreement may still exist in so far the Community's participation in the international agreement is necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives laid down by the Treaty. The Court so concluded in Opinion 1/76, based on the idea that the Community's internal and external competences run in parallel. 13 Aside from concluding that implied competences were not limited to common policies but covered all Treaty objectives and did not necessarily depend on the prior exercise of internal competences, the Court also held that once the EC had exercised its competence by way of concluding an international agreement, Member States could participate only in those parts of agreement which were not covered by the community competence at all.
10. In Opinion 1/76, the Court addressed the issue of mixed agreements, i.e.
international agreements requiring signature and conclusion by the EU and by each Member State, for the first time. It held that when agreements fall entirely within the EU's shared competence (e.g. in common transport policy), mixity needs to be legally justified and is not simply optional. In areas of shared competence the EU may decide not to participate in the negotiation or conclusion of international agreements. However, where the EU becomes a party and the agreement comes entirely within its exclusive or shared competence, it becomes difficult to justify mixity.
14
The EU may then decide to exercise its competence for only one part of the agreement.
15
The Court viewed mixity more favourably in Opinion 1/78 (see paragraph 3). As Member States financed the buffer stock -the essential element of the agreement -the participation of Member States in the mixed agreement was justified. The Court stressed that mixity was required in so far as certain Member States represented 'dependent territories' not belonging to the Community. Mixed agreements have played an important role in the field of CCP as both the Commission and the Member States concluded trade and investment agreements. The literature explains the need for mixity by, among others, the desire of Member States to appear as visible actors on the international scene, the Commission's attempts to avoid inter-institutional tension and the need to delimit competences in specific cases. 6 increase the complexity of the agreements, and may deter third states from entering trade and investment agreements with the EU and its Member States.
11. In the 1990s, the ECJ issued three opinions which limited the broad principles spelled out by the Court in the 1970s. In Opinion 2/91, the Court clarified the nature of implied competences by pointing out that the Community's exclusive competence may flow from either treaty provisions granting the EC express external competences, e.g. Article 113 EC, or it may be based on the principle of preemption (the AETR principle).
17
The Court stressed that pre-emption did not only apply within the framework of the common policies listed in the Treaty, but extended to any area corresponding to the objectives of the Treaty. Member States are thus required to abstain from those measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the Treaty objectives. The Court also concluded that agreements could be negotiated in areas of shared competence, provided the Community and the Members States acted jointly with respect to the negotiation and implementation of the agreement The Court thus reiterated the duty to co-operate as central to mixed agreements, a principle it had already articulated in Opinion 1/78.
12.
In Opinion 1/94 the Court set further limits on the exclusivity of implied competences (see paragraph 6 above). The Commission argued that it had exclusive competence to conclude the 1994 WTO Agreement, based among others on the doctrine of implied competences. The Court held that the EC lacked exclusive external competence in the areas covered by the GATS and the TRIPS. It limited its holding in Opinion 1/76 that the exercise of external competences could turn them into exclusive competences if such exercise was necessary for the attainment of a Community objective to situations in which achievement of a Community objective was inextricably linked to external action (see paragraphs 9-10). 13. The Court also considered whether exclusivity could be based on the AETR preemption principle. It argued that the EC could achieve exclusive external competence when internal legislation either 1) contained provisions on the subject matter (i.e. where the international commitments fell within the scope of common rules, or within an area which was already largely covered by such rules); 2) expressly granted the EC competence to negotiate with non-member countries in this area, or 3) in completely harmonised areas. In Opinion 1/94, the Court held that the harmonisation achieved was not sufficient to rule out Member States' competence and that external action was not a precondition for successful harmonization in those areas. The Court found that the competence to conclude GATS and TRIPS was shared between the Community and the Member States. The literature criticised the Court's greater judicial restraint to confirm external competences, compared to its previous decisions.
7
have vested exclusive external competence in the Community.
19
It established that Article 113 EC could not grant the Community exclusive external competence in the areas of the Decision. Member States are only excluded from acting in the presence of common rules. It found that even though the EC had adopted measures in the areas covered by the Decision which could pre-empt Member States participation, it did not cover the Decision's field as a whole. The Court thus concluded that the Community and the Member States shared competence to adopt the OECD National Treatment Decision. The Opinion is important because the Court indirectly recognised implied competences with respect to the establishment of foreign investors (see paragraph 32 below).
15. In Opinion 1/03, the last major ruling concerning implied competences, the Court considered whether the conclusion of the Lugano Convention 20 fell entirely within the exclusive competence of the Community, or within the shared competence of the Community and Member States. 21 In its analysis, the Court recalled the three (illustrative) scenarios in which it had recognised exclusive competence in Opinion 1/94. The Court reaffirmed an open-ended approach when examining 'areas which are already covered to a large extent by Community rules'. It explained that it was not necessary for the areas covered by the international agreement and Community legislation to coincide fully. Furthermore, not only to take the current state of Community law in the area in question but also its future development needed to be considered, in so far as that was foreseeable at the time of the analysis. The Court also highlighted the overall rationale behind the AETR principle by stressing the importance of ensuring a uniform and consistent application of the Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which was established in order to preserve the full effectiveness of the Community law. The Court concluded that the Lugano Convention came within the Community's exclusive competence. 19. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty has further codified the principles developed by the ECJ on implied external competences. Pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU, 'the Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the EU to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.' Similarly, Article 216(1) TFEU (which does not distinguish between exclusive and shared competences) states that the EU may conclude international agreements 'where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.' 20. Article 207(6) TFEU sets out the limitations to EU competences under the CCP. Article 207(6) TFEU aims to prevent the exercise of the EU external competence from affecting the balance of competence between the EU and its Member States within the Union's internal order.
EU Competence after the Treaty of Lisbon

23
First, it states that the exercise of the competences conferred on the EU by Article 207 in the field of the CCP does not affect the delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member States. This reflects the general principle of limited and specific conferral of competences in Articles 4(1), 5(1) and 5(2) TFEU. This element is unrelated to the principle of parallelism between external and internal competences which involves the determination of implicit external competence, not express external competence. 23. According to Article 207 TFEU, the CCP covers trade in services. The EU is therefore exclusively competent to negotiate and implement trade agreements in so far as they contain provisions on services. The TFEU has abandoned the shared competence concerning agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services previously found in Article 133 TEC. However, Article 207(4) TFEU requires unanimity in the Council for the conclusion of trade agreements concerning services in these sectors, when there is a risk that the agreements will affect these sectors in certain ways.
24. The sole exception, in Article 207(5) TFEU, concerns the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport which is subject to Title VI of Part Three of TFEU (common transport policy), an is hence an area of shared competence. This means that WTO negotiations and agreements concerning transport services are not within the EU's exclusive competences unless the EU's implied powers in this field are exclusive.
26
The provisions of Title VI only apply to transport by rail, road and inland waterways (Article 100(1) TFEU). However, under Article 100(2) TFEU, the European Parliament and the Council, 10 acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may decide to lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air transport. The EU has exercised its competence in the field of maritime transport by concluding external maritime agreements with third countries (or included maritime elements in wider external agreements), aiming to improve market access for EU shipping in third countries. These include e.g. the EU-China Maritime Transport Agreement.
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This is a mixed agreement falling within shared competence. It aims at improving the conditions under which maritime cargo transport operations are carried out and deals with broader maritime transport cooperation. The European Commission generally negotiates for the EU and its Member States in the WTO, including in negotiations on maritime trade in services. The EU is an observer at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). However, as the EU is not a member, it cannot conclude maritime conventions elaborated within IMO. This situation has led to difficulties, which the ECJ addressed in several rulings. others have argued that the term reflects TRIPS as it stood at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty.
31
In the absence of provision similar to Article 133(7) TEC which enabled the Council to extend the application of the CCP to international agreements on intellectual property not yet covered by the CCP, adopting a static interpretation would deprive the EU of the possibility to negotiate and conclude changes in the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, some authors have argued that Article 207 TFEU contains a dynamic reference, covering all issues that may be included in the TRIPS Agreement after a future WTO 32 27. In the Sanofi-Avantis case, 33 the Court in July 2013 addressed the question of whether Article 27 of TRIPS on patentability fell within the competence of Mem States. The Commission argued that the whole TRIPS relates to 'commercial aspects of intellectual property' within the meaning of Article 207(1) TFEU a fell within the EU's exclusive competence. By contrast, EU Member State maintained that the majority of the rules in the TRIPS, such as those on patentability in Article 27, concern international trade only indirectly, and did not therefore fall within the CCP. They argued that 28. Having examined the relevant legislation and case law, the Court recognised that the rules adopted by the European Union in the field of intellectual property, only those with a specific link to international trade are capable of falling within The Court established that rules of the TRIPS have such a special link to international trade since the TRIPS is one of the principal WTO agreements. It emphasised that one of the objectives of the TRIPS was to reduce distortions of international trade by ensuring, in the territory of each member of the WTO, the effective protection of intellectual property rights. Since rules on patentability are intended to standardise certain key aspects of patents globally and thereby facilitat international trade, the Court concluded that Article 27 of the TRIPS fell within the field of the CCP and thus within EU exclusive competence. The question arises whether the Court would reach the same conclusion with respect to the provisions regulating criminal penalties for infringement of intellectual property rights. When explaining the special link to international trade, the Court based its analysis on the objectives of TRIPS in general and Part II in particular, but it did not mention Part III which regulates enforcement. However, the Court indicated that every provision in TRIPS which was adopted with an intention to foster world trade by sta 34. Alongside the BIT programmes of its Member States, the EU negotiated market access for non-services investment in bilateral agreements on the basis of the 'minimum platform on investment'
40
-a standardised text prepared in 2006 for the use in future EU agreements. In the same year, the Commission urged that new E free trade agreements should seek comprehensive liberalisation in particular in areas of services and investment. 41 The Minimum Platform for EU FTAs pursu two objectives: first, the EU sought additional market access commitments in a number of priority services in GATS modes 1, 3, and 4 (cross-border service, commercial presence, temporary entry of the service provider); and second, it sought to ensure some post-establishment standards, namely national treatment and most favoured nation treatment for service suppliers, commercial pre This definition reflects the widely accepted definitions of the IMF and the OECD. The Court further distinguished between 'direct investment' which includes 'investments in the form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of shares which confers the possibility of effectively participating in its management and control' and 'portfolio investment' involving 'investment in the form of acquisition of shares fi of the undertaking'. 46 36. As most MS BITs cover both FDI and portfolio investment, the question arises whether the EU competence under the CCP encompasses portfolio investments as well. In its Communication Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, the Commission argued that the Treaty provisions on capital a payments complement the EU's exclusive competence under the CCP and provid for an implied exclusive competence.
47
The Commission referred to Article 3(2) TFEU and suggested that the EU had implied exclusive competence to regulate portfolio investment of EU investors in third countries to the extent that agreements on investment affect common rules set under the chapter on capita and payments (Articles 63-66 TFEU The Commission rejected these suggestions in its Communication. 59 First, it argued that Article 345 TFEU does not exclude harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions regarding property issues. T Commission pointed out that the ECJ, for example, has expressly confirmed th Article 345 TFEU does not bar the EU from adopting measures to harmo certain aspects of intellectual property rights. 60 The Court has interpreted Article 345 TFEU narrowly so that Member States only have the competence to decide whether and when expropriation occurs and not to define the conditions under which expropriation takes place. 61 Treaties providing for investment protectio not affect the system of property ownership -rather they require that expro be subject to certain conditions, including the payment of compensation. Seco the inclusion of expropriation clauses in EU agreements does not affect the 56 46. In 2012 the Commission prepared a proposal for a regulation on managing responsibility arising from investor-state arbitration awards brought under investment protection agreements to which the EU is a party. The proposed regulation addresses the issues of defence and financial responsibility in cases where the EU is sued under the provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) included in EU-third country agreements. 66 The draft regulation sets out wh bears financial responsibility, who is the respondent, who defend the measures of the EU or its Member States, and who is liable to pay any award for compensation. The Regulation is based on the following principles: financial responsibility lies with the actor responsible for the action; the operation of the Regulation must be budge tween the EU and Member States as to the allocation of financial responsibility). nal rules n claim ers is les s a e will in effect bind tribunals in claims brought under those agreements.
f he ith iod of BITs are widely concluded by the EU rather than its Member States alone. 
The Exercise of Competences
Trade Defence i)
50. Trade defence measures are used to re-establish a level playing field when an EU industry has been harmed by dumped or subsidised goods or a rapid increase in imports. There are three types of trade defence instruments which aim at protecting the EU market from imports: (i) anti-dumping duties, applied when a company is exporting a product to the EU at prices lower than the normal value of the product on its own domestic market; (ii) anti-subsidies measures, designed to neutralise the benefit of a subsidy paid by the government of a third country, applied to imported goods when the subsidy is limited to a specific industry or group of industries; and iii) safeguards dealing with situations in which an EU industry is affected by an unforeseen, sharp and sudden increase of imports. These measures, which usually take the form of increased duties on products imported into the EU from other countries, may be imposed only after a formal investigation. 52. Member States are represented in trade defence advisory committees. They advise the Commission on dumping and subsidies, in particular on whether or not to initiate proceedings, whether or not to impose provisional or definitive measures and on any amendments to existing measures. However, the committee's advice is not binding on the Commission. As a result, the Commission may levy duties without obtaining the collective agreement of Member States. This has been the case with the biggest trade investigation to date in respect to solar panels imported into the EU from China. In May 2013, the Commission decided to impose provisional tariffs on solar panels imported from China in order to counter the alleged dumping of these products on the EU market. It did so despite the opposition of 18 Member States, led by Germany and the UK. The voice of the Member States, however, ultimately had an important impact. First, their resistance against the duties was reflected in substantially lower anti-dumping duties (11.8 percent as compared to the original proposal of 47 percent Only four of the 28 Member States and none of the major industry players (e.g. Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia Siemens) have supported the telecommunications investigation. The situation has led to calls for a negotiated settlement before any further escalation into a trade war. In light of the solar panel settlement it is unlikely that the case will proceed to the investigation stage. 70 Both cases demonstrate that despite the Commission's increased formal competences in the field of trade defence measures, in practice, Member States have retained an important voice.
ii) Export Controls
54. The EU policy on export with third countries is regulated by Council Regulation 1016/2009 establishing common rules for export. The regulation is based on the principle of freedom of export which is subject to certain limits. First, pursuant to Article 6, the Commission, acting at the request of the Member State concerned or on its own initiative, can make the export of a product subject to the production of an export authorisation in order to prevent a critical situation from arising on account of a shortage of essential products, or to remedy such a situation. Second, Article 9 establishes a special transitional regime for petroleum products listed in Annex II of the Regulation. Third, Article 10 permits Member States to introduce quantitative restrictions on exports on the grounds laid down in Article 36 TFEU (public morality; public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of human rights; animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial and commercial property).
55. The question of the permissible scope of national economic measures applied under Article 10 affecting trade in light of the exclusive EU competence under the CCP arises. In principle, where a Member State seeks to adopt export restrictions, it must comply with EU trade legislation. This was confirmed in Werner and Leifer, 71 where the ECJ held that measures whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain goods cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of the CCP on the ground that they have foreign policy and security objections. In both judgments, the Court, however, accepted that a Member State has a right to limit an export for public security reasons pursuant to Article 10 of the Regulation and Article 36 
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TFEU. In Werner, which concerned a decision by the German authority to refuse to issue a German company with a license to export dual-use goods to Libya 72 , the Court said that Article 36 TFEU and Article 10 of the Regulation have to be interpreted consistently (so that export restrictions within the internal market are not stricter than restrictions of movement of goods between Member States and third countries). The Court thus interpreted the term 'public security' flexibly so as to include the peaceful co-existence of nations and Germany's external relations. In Leifer, which concerned a German national prosecuted for having delivered plant and chemical products to Iraq without obtaining necessary export licenses, the Court similarly confirmed the right of Member States to exceptionally restrict export of dual-use goods to non-member countries when this is required for public security reasons. In Centro-Com, the Court, however, rejected the UK's recourse to the exception in Article 10 of the Regulation since the EU rules already provided necessary measures to ensure protection of the interests listed in that Article. 73 The Court thus held that once the EU has adopted measures harmonising the conditions of export, then Member States must respect the relevant Union rules. Although strategic control on military goods primarily falls within Member State competence, 76 the EU has played an important role in harmonising national arms export control policies. In 1998 the Council adopted the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which established a notification and consultation mechanism for export licence denials and laid down criteria that Member States should apply when considering whether to grant or to deny an arms export license. The Code of Conduct was replaced in 2008 by the Council's Common Position 2008/844/CFSP which deepens and widens its application in order to further harmonise Member States' export policies. In 2012, the Council also adopted a Common Military List of the European Union, listing equipment that should be subject to control. Like the Common Position, the Military List is only a political commitment, which means that it acts as a reference point for Member States' national military technology and equipment lists. It neither directly replaces them nor is it binding.
iii) Import Controls
58. Imports in the EU from non-Member States are regulated by the Regulation 260/2009 on Common Rules for Imports ("the Imports Regulation") which, similarly to the Exports Regulation, is based on the principle that imports are free, i.e. that they are not subject to any quantitative restrictions.
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There are two types of import controls: import licensing and import bans. In general, import licensing is not required for products entering an EU country, except for products governed by quantitative restrictions (i.e. quotas) and surveillance (monitoring of the imports by the EU in order to increase transparency in trade, but without the purpose of imposing limits on access to the EU market). This includes some agricultural products, textile and iron and steel products from certain countries. Bans or prohibitions, on the other hand, apply when no import is allowed (e.g. torture equipment, certain products from Iran, Syria and North Korea etc). The EU import controls apply directly to a Member State, reflecting a measure agreed within the EU or internationally (e.g. a UN Security Council resolution).
59. The Imports Regulation contains provisions on safeguards measures and, like the Exports Regulation, permits Member States to derogate from the freedom to import on the same grounds as those laid down in Article 36 TFEU (e.g. to protect public morality, security, the health and life of humans, animals or plants, property and others). Member States must inform the Commission about the measures they intend to introduce. In the event of extreme urgency, however, the national measures can be communicated to the Commission immediately after their adoption. The UK has introduced only few national import controls, e.g. import licensing on firearms which underpins domestic legislation on the possession of firearms so that only those with authority to possess firearms can import them.
78 60. Import controls may not necessarily take the form of quantitative restrictions but may be also introduced as measures having equivalent effect (e.g. national pricing system). A good illustration is the recent proposal for the introduction of minimum alcohol pricing by the Scottish Government.
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The proposal aims at reducing alcohol consumption in Scotland to improve public health. According to the proposal, an alcohol product must not be sold to consumers below a minimum price. The proposal is alleged to constitute a measure having an equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports, inasmuch as that it leads to the price of products being fixed as a function of a series of national objectives. Indeed, in Werner, the ECJ, relying on both a contextual interpretation and Article XI of GATT, said that a regulation based on Article 207 TFEU, whose objective was to implement the principle of free exportation at the Union level, could not exclude from its scope measures adopted by the Member States whose effect was equivalent to a quantitative restriction where their application could lead to an export prohibition. Given the similarities between the objectives and the structure of the export and import regimes, the ECJ is likely to apply the same reasoning with respect to quantitative restrictions on imports.
A practical problem with respect to import controls (and trade restrictions in general)
imposed by the Member States is reflected in the potentially contradictory roles that the Commission may assume by acting in two different capacities. The Commission has voiced opposition to the Scottish proposal arguing that it may create obstacles to the free movement of goods within the internal market contrary to Article 34 TFEU and that it appears to be disproportionate under Article 36 TFEU. In addition, Article III. 4 GATT 1947 may prohibit minimum prices. 80 In the case of a GATT dispute initiated by a WTO member that is not a member of the EU, the European Commission would be responsible for defending the policy under the WTO. The Commission could therefore theoretically find itself in a contradictory dual role -as a prosecutor arguing against the Scottish proposal before the ECJ in its function as the guardian of the single market, as well as a defender of the same proposal in a potential WTO dispute.
iv) Export Credits
62. The exclusive nature of EU competence over export credits was already apparent in 1970, when the transitional period for the implementation of the CCP ended. The EU at that time adopted specific legislation harmonizing national laws concerning state-sponsored credit insurance of exports. 81 Moreover, in Opinion 1/75 the Court recognised that the EU has exclusive competence in the field of the CCP, which covers export policy, and thus systems of aids for exports, including export credits. Although Member States have their own export credit agencies (ECAs) which are regulated by national rules, the Commission has played an active role in the harmonization of ECAs and the co-ordination of policy statements and negotiation positions. It exercised its competence in the CCP by negotiating the Arrangement on Export Credits (1978) at the OECD. The arrangement is a voluntary agreement which aims at creating a level playing-field at international level by regulating the financial terms and conditions that export credit agencies may offer. Traditionally, the OECD's work on export credits has been largely trade policy-oriented, however recently, it has expanded to accommodate corporate social responsibility (CSR). While the Commission's competence over financial, trade-related aspects of export credits is undisputed, the question arises whether it is also competent to negotiate the non-financial aspects of export credits which are not covered by the CCP. Article 205 TFEU, according to which the Commission must pursue its external trade action in accordance to principles and objectives laid down in Article 21 EU Treaty, may provide a basis for the EU to negotiate also non-trade related aspects of export credits.
63. In order to ensure the application of the OECD Arrangement, the EU has adopted Regulation No. 1233/2011 which provides for the Commission to adopt delegated acts in order to incorporate future changes to the OECD guidelines into EU law.
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The Regulation sets reporting requirements for Member States who have to make available to the Commission an annual activity report and, among others, report on how environmental risks are taken into account in the ECA's activities. Furthermore, the Regulation includes a recital stating that Member States should comply with the Union's general provisions on external action, such as consolidating democracy, respect for human rights and policy coherence for development, and the fight against climate change, when establishing, developing and implementing their national export credit systems and when carrying out their supervision of officially supported ECAs. The EU has therefore incorporated broader non-financial issues into its export credit policy, notwithstanding that the legal basis for the regulation is Article 21 of the TFEU. It remains to be seen how the Commission will monitor ECAs' compliance with the Regulation. The EEAS sends EU delegations to third countries and international organisations. however, the Commission has the power to issue instructions to the delegations in the area of the CCP. 85 The Commission, rather than the EEAS, is likely to be the decisive actor shaping the nature and content of future trade and investment agreements, as most of the technical expertise on the CCP remains with the Commission. 71. In addition, Article 207(4) subparagraph 3 TFEU requires unanimity for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements 'in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity' and 'in the field of trade in social, education and health services where these agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member Sta deliver them.' This provision raises some interpretive uncertainties. First, the meaning of the ambiguous term 'cultural and linguistic diversity', which has not been used in the context of the CCP before, is unclear. 88 Second, the provision requires an assessment of the risk posed by an international agreement in these services sectors. The Treaty, however, fails to explain how such risk assessment should be conducted hose priorities the Council and Commission will be unable to ignore in all cases.
v) Trade and Investment Promotion
Decision-making in the Council
general rules on the conclusion of international agreements in Article 218 TFEU. Accordingly, the Council must consult the European Parliament before it concludes the agreement. 91 This is in contrast with the TEC which excluded trade agreem from parliamentary consultation. Furthermore, Article 218(6)(a) TFEU requir parliamentary consent in five specific categories of cases, among others to 'agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the Parliament is required.' Since Article 207(2) TFEU requires the establishment of the framework for implementing the CCP in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedu can be assumed that the European Parliament's consent is required for the conclusion of all agreements in the field of CCP. 92 The requirement of parliamentary consent strengthens the European Parliament's influence in the negotiation process of international agreements and arguably improves the democratic legitimacy of external trade and investment policy. Such legitimacy is particularly important in light of the reduced influence of national parliaments of t Member States who are no longer required (and also unable) to ratify trade 75. The expansion of parliamentary powers will undoubtedly affect EU trade and investment policymaking, due to the Parliament's stronger responsiveness t environmental and social demands voiced by civil society organisations, in particular contemplating the far-reaching policy objectives of EU external act which now govern the conduct of the CCP. Already in 2006, the Parliament emphasised that it would give consent to trade and investment agreements o the non-economic principles and objectives laid down in Article 21 TEU are sufficiently taken into account. 93 Parliament could withhold its consent for bilat or multilateral trade agreements which fail to take account of human rights or environmental concerns. The Parliament has already demonstrated how it to use its leverage generated from the consent requirement to shape the implementation of new international agreements. The result of intensive discussions between the Parliament and the Commission during the process of approv EU-Korea FTA was a Commission statement and Joint Declaration of the Parliament and the Commission on the EU-Korea FTA. The Commission committed, among others, to report, at the request of the responsible committee, on Korea's 94
Conclusion
77. This report has presented the treaty provisions and case law that set out the balance of competences between the EU and its Member States regarding trade and investment. It has outlined the nature and the scope of post-Lisbon EU competence in the fields of trade and investment. The Lisbon Treaty gave the EU exclusive external competence over trade in goods, services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment. The most important current controversy concerns the question whether the EU is competent to regulate portfolio investment, which has significant implications for existing and future FTAs with investment chapters and BITs. The report also showed that de jure competence and de facto exercise of competence can diverge, in particular on trade defences and trade and investment promotion. With the emergence of the European Parliament as an important actor in respect of the CCP, inter-institutional dynamics, alongside the formal division of competence, are likely to significantly shape EU policymaking on trade and investment.
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